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Constitutional Law-CRIMINALLAW-PRETRIALDETAINEES
MAY
TO CONDITIONS
OF CONFINEMENT
REASONABLY
REBE SUBJECTED
LATED TO LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT
OBJECTIVES-BellV. Wolfish, 99
S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
Pretrial detainees1 brought a class action2 challenging the
constitutionality of numerous practices and conditions of confinement a t the federally operated Metropolitan Correction Center
(MCC)"n New York City. The challenged practices and conditions included: (1) housing two inmates in rooms intended for
single occupancy (double-bunking), (2) prohibiting the receipt of
hardback books not mailed directly from the publisher, (3) prohibiting the receipt of packages from outside the institution, and
(4) conducting visual body-cavity searches of pretrial detainees
following contact visit^.^
The district court enjoined these and other MCC practices
and conditions on various constitutional grounds, including the
pretrial detainees' right to be presumed innocent.VI'he United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in part and held that the MCC had failed to
make a showing of "compelling necessity'' sufficient to justify the
substantial infringement of privacy caused by double-bunking?
1. Pretrial detainees are "unconvicted individuals awaiting trial, held a t the MCC
[Metropolitan Correction Center] because they could not post bail." Wolfish v. Levi, 573
F.2d 118, 122 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978). The term is also used to include those accused of nonbailable offenses. See Bail Reform Act 8 3(a), 18 U.S.C. 4 3146 (1976).
2. The action originated when inmate Louis Wolfish, proceeding pro se, sought a writ
of habeas corpus. A week later, on Dec. 2, 1975, the action was declared a class action on
behalf of all persons confined a t the Metropolitan Correction Center in New York City.
Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1978).
3. The MCC is a short-term custodial facility designed primarily to house persons
detained in custody prior to trial for federal criminal offenses. In addition, the MCC
confines some convicted inmates awaiting transfer to other facilities and others awaiting
trial under writs of habeas corpus. The facility also houses witnesses in protective custody
and persons incarcerated for contempt. Id. a t 122 n.6.
4. The amended petition also decried the following: ( I ) a prohibition against the use
of personal typewriters, (2) the monitoring of personal mail, (3) arbitrary disciplinary
procedures, (4) inadequate prisoner classification, (5) poor ventilation, (6) inadequate and
unsanitary food, (7) improper restrictions on religious freedom, and (8)a requirement that
detainees not be present during room inspections by officials. Id. a t 123 n.7.
5. The district court in two opinions and in a series of orders enjoined 20 MCC
practices on constitutional and statutory grounds. See United States ex rel. Wolfish v.
Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States ex rel. Wolfish v. United States,
428 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
6. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 1978). The double-bunking issue involved an alleged due process violation and was the issue emphasized by the majority
opinion. This Note, therefore, will focus on the double-bunking issue and the court's due
process test for pretrial detention.
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In Bell v. Wolfish7 the United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court, examining for the first time the constitutional
rights of pretrial detainee^,^ held that neither the due process
clause nor the presumption of innocence doctrine provides the
source for a compelling necessity standard.' The majority held
that in evaluating conditions of pretrial confinement that allegedly involve deprivations of liberty without due process of law the
proper inquiry should be whether such conditions or practices
amount to punishment of the detainee.1° Conditions or practices
are unconstitutional if detention facility officials intend by them
to punish detainees." Punitive intent may be inferred if prison
practices are not "reasonably related" to governmental interests;
but if they are reasonably related, the practices do not constitute
punishment .I2

The federal judiciary has traditionally taken a "hands-off"
approach to the problems of prison administration? In recent
years, however, the courts have become increasingly involved in
litigation brought by inmates challenging various conditions of
their confinement. l4
In 1974 the Supreme Court instructed courts to discharge
their duty to protect individual rights when a prison regulation
offends a "fundamental constitutional guarantee."Vn a case
decided the same year the Court stated that there is no longer an
7. 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
8. The Supreme Court raised the issue in Gerstein v. R g h , 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27
(1975), but did not resolve it. See id. a t 126-27 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9. 99 S. Ct. a t 1869-71.
10. Id. a t 1872-74.
11. Id. a t 1873-74.
12. Id.
13. For a history of the hands-off doctrine, see Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:
A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALEL.J. 506
(1963). See also Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REV.985 (1962).
14. In 1972 the Supreme Court twice reversed dismissals of prison suits, rejecting the
lower courts' application of the abstention doctrine and ordering trials on the merits. See
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The
number of such cases continued to increase in spite of the emphasis in Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,405 (1974), that "courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform." The Court in Procunier also
noted that courts are "ill suited to act as the front-line agencies for the consideration and
resolution of the infinite variety of prisoner complaints." Id. a t 405 n.9.
15. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,405-06 (1974); accord, Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483, 486 (1969).
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"iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of
this country."16These and other rulings were the impetus behind
a number of lower court cases dealing with the constitutional
rights of both sentenced prisoners and pretrial ,detainees.17

A.

Pretrial Detainees and Punishment

As the judiciary became more involved in defining the rights
of pretrial detainees, issues often centered on whether conditions
of confinement amounted to "punishment," which cannot be constitutionally administered until after a determination of guilt?
The leading case defining punishment was Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez. la In Kennedy the Supreme Court examined a statute
that automatically divested persons of citizenship who left or
remained outside the United States during national emergencies
to avoid military service. In finding the sanction punitive, and
therefore unconstitutional, the Court listed the guidelines that
have traditionally been applied to determine whether an act of
Congress is penal or regulatory. The guidelines included whether
the sanction (1)involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2)
has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) operates to
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence; (4) has an alternative purpose assignable to it; and
(5) appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose.20
In contrast to these guidelines, the Supreme Court has also
recognized that confinement in an institution necessarily brings
with it a withdrawal or limitation of certain rights and privileges." The Court accordingly has granted prison administrators
wide-ranging deference to adopt policies necessary to preserve
16. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
17. See, e . g , Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183,1187 (3d Cir. 1978); Fano v. Meachum,
520 F.2d 374, 376 (1st Cir. 1975).
18. See notes 32-42 and accompanying text infra. One of the earliest statements
concerning pretrial confinement comes from Blackstone, not the courts:
[Tlhis imprisonement, as has been said, is only for safe custody, and not
for punishment: therefore, in this dubious interval between the commitment
and trial, a prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity; and neither
be loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other hardships than such as are
absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only . . . .
4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
297 (Oxford 1769).
19. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
20. Id. a t 168-69.
21. See, e.g., Pel1 v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S.
266, 285 (1948).
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internal order and
The resulting problem of how to
determine whether a prison practice is punitive, and therefore
unconstitutional, or whether it falls within the discretion granted
detention officials, has been dealt with differently by the courts.23
Part of the difficulty exists because of the conflicting interests at stake. Pretrial incarceration can have strong effects upon
a detainee. It deprives him not only of his liberty, but of his
ability to support himself and his dependents. It casts him in an
aura of guilt, and may cost him his job." Additionally, one study
suggests that pretrial detainees are more likely to be convicted or
to receive prison sentences than defendants who remain free while
they await trial.2VI'his disparity, according to a t least one commentator, cannot be accounted for by a comparison of the freed
and detained defendants' prior records, bail amounts, employment histories, or counsel's cornpeten~e.~~
The competing concern is that detainees pose a serious threat
Referring to detention tento the internal security of a fa~ility.~'
ters that house pretrial detainees, one court stated: "In some
respects, the difficulty in maintaining order, discipline, and security in such a setting far exceeds that in facilities for convicted
persons . . . ."2R Some judges feel that because pretrial detainees
are likely to be recidivists or persons charged with serious crimes,
they should be subjected to even greater restrictions that those
imposed on regular inmates?

B. Sources of the Right to Be Free from Punishment
Prior to 1977 many courts assumed that the eighth amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment was
22. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U S . 119, 128 (1977);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U S . 396, 404-05 (1974).
23. Indeed, a conflict existed among the circuits. This is one reason the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the instant case. 99 S. Ct. a t 1866.
24. See, e . g , Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U S . 103, 114 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel.
Hartage v. Hendrick, 439 Pa. 584, 601, 268 A.2d 451, 459 (1970) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
See generally Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 2 WIS. L. REV.441, 450-59 (1978).
25. Ares, Rankin, & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the
Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV.67, 84-86 (1963).
26. Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.641, 655 (1964).
27. 99 S. Ct. a t 1878 n.28.
28. Thomas v. State, 39 Md. App. 217, 227 n.11, 384 A.2d 772, 779 n.11 (1978).
29. DiMarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir.) (Campbell, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 312 (1978).
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directly applicable to pretrial detainees.30In 1977, however, the
Supreme Court held in a different context that the eighth amendment is designed to protect only those persons convicted of
crimes.3tCourts, therefore, have had to look elsewhere to find the
source of a pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment.
1. The presumption of innocence

One of the fundamental tenets of the American criminal system is that a person is presumed innocent until proven
Many courts have considered this principle to be the source of a
pretrial detainee's right to be free from p ~ n i s h m e n tFor
. ~ ~example, in Conklin v. H ~ n c o c k the
, ~ court stated: "Petitioner is a
pretrial detainee and not a convict. Under the Constitution, he
is presumed to be innocent of the pending and untried criminal
charges against him. He cannot be subject to any punishment

. . . ."

35

At least one court has rejected the use of the presumption of
innocence doctrine in cases involving pretrial detainee^,^^ although the Supreme Court, at least until Bell v. Wolfish, had
implied that its use in such a context might be appr~priate.~'
30. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 302 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Jones v.
Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456
F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
31. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
J
32. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
33. See, e.g., Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Detainees
of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975);
Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974).
34. 334 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971).
35. Id. a t 1121.
36. Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1080 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976)
("We note that some courts have apparently relied upon the 'presumption of innocence'
in cases involving pretrial detainees. However, we do not believe that principle serves as
the source for those substantive rights. Rather, the presumption allocates the burden of
proof."). See also Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521,568 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (MacKinnon,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (pretrial detainee's presumption of innocence
sufficiently rebutted by competent evidence to justify his confinement).
37. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U S . 1 (1951).
In McGinnis the unavailability of rehabilitation programs to a pretrial detainee made it
difficult for him to receive "good time" credit. The Court said, "[Ilt would hardly be
appropriate for the State to undertake in the pretrial detention period programs to rehabilitate a man still clothed with the presumption of innocence." 410 U.S. a t 273. In Stack
the Court stated that the right to reasonable bail before trial "serves to prevent the
infliction of punishment prior to conviction," and "[u]nless this right to bail before trial
is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would
lose its meaning." 342 U.S. a t 4.
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2. Substantive rights under the due process clause

The courts have also considered the due process clauseMas a
source of an unconvicted person's substantive righv9 to be free
from many restraints of confinement. For example, in Jones v.
Wittenberg40the court held that the crowded conditions that existed in a county jail violated the detainees' due process rights.
In ordering the alleviation of the crowded conditions, the court
said, "Obviously, no person may be punished except by due process of law."41In many analogous situations the Supreme Court
has applied this general principle that punishment can only follow a determination of guilt." In addition, the due process clause,
along with the equal protection clause,43has been relied upon to
protect detainees from less tolerable conditions of confinement
than those provided for convicted ~ h m i n a l s . ~ ~
C. Standards of Review in Detainee Cases

The courts that have dealt with the problems of pretrial confinement have had little difficulty in agreeing that detainees
should not be punished. The more difficult problem has been to
determine what constitutes punishment. A disparity has arisen as
courts have attempted to set a standard by which to determine
--

38. The due process clause is found in both the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The fifth amendment applies here because the MCC is a federal facility. It reads in
pertinent part: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . ." U S . CONST.amend. V.
39. The due process clause supplies not only a "procedural guarantee against the
deprivation of 'liberty,' but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional restrictions by the State." Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U S . 238, 244 (1976).
40. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854
(6th Cir. 1972).
41. 323 F. Supp. a t 100. See also Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (3d Cir.
1978) (detainee deprived of liberty without due process when drug treatment discontinued); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336-37 (2d Cir. 1974) (detainees protected from
punishment as a matter of due process).
42. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U S . 144, 165-67, 186 (1963) (statute stripping draft evaders of citizenship held unconstitutional); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U S . 228, 237 (1896) (a judicial trial is required before aliens may be subjected
to punishment a t hard labor). For instances where the Court recognized that regulatory
restraints may be imposed without due process of law, see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 613-14 (1960), and De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U S . 144, 160 (1960).
43. Compare Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (equal
protection demands that pretrial conditions of confinement be "superior" to those for
sentenced prisoners) with Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974) (equal
protection clause protects detainees from "worse" conditions than imposed on sentenced
prisoners). Bell u. Wolfish did not involve the equal protection issue.
44. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823,827 (3d Cir. 1976).
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the constitutionality of practices and conditions of pretrial confinement.
1. Compelling necessity or least restrictive alternative test

A majority of federal courts have held that pretrial detainees
should not be subjected to any hardships or restrictions except
those justified by the "compelling necessities" of jail administration, or that are "absolutely requisite" for the purpose of confinement.4VI'his standard relies in part on a line of Supreme Court
cases holding that where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, limiting such rights may be justified only by a
"compelling state interest."46 In applying this rule, however,
many courts have required that a compelling necessity exist to
justify every condition of confinement, whether it infringes a fundamental interest or not.47
The courts applying the compelling necessity standard frequently have used a "least restrictive alternative" test as well.
This doctrine requires t h a t each deprivation imposed on detainees be the least restrictive alternative available to maintain
order and ~ecurity.~"he practical results of this doctrine have
been (1) a prohibition against subjecting pretrial detainees to
harsher conditions than those imposed on convicted criminal^,^'
and (2) a rule that pretrial detainees can be deprived of their
45. The compelling necessity standard was the majority rule until the instant case.
It was followed by the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits, and district court cases in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits. See Rhem v. Malcolm,
507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974); Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (3d Cir. 1978);
Patterson v. Morrisette, 564 F.2d 1109, 1110 (4th Cir. 1977) (by implication); Miller v.
Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 1977); Inmates of San Diego County Jail v. Duffy 528
F.2d 954, 956 (9th Cir. 1975); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521,531 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 897-98 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in relevant part, 570
F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1971) aff'd
sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
46. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U S . 113, 155 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969).
47. See generally Comment, Pre-Trial Detention: Constitutional Standards, 28 ARK.
L. REV.129 (1974); Note, Discipline in Jails: The Due Process Rights of Pretrial Detainees,
54 B.U.L. REV.796 (1974); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial
Detention, 79 YALEL.J. 941 (1970).
48. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182,1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Cf. Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U S . 479,488 (1960) ("In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved.")
49. See, e.g., Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582,593-94 (D.P.R. 1976);
Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225, 1234 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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liberty only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence a t
trial?
2.

The due process balancing approach

Another test applied by the courts involves a balancing approach." This approach requires a court to weigh the detainee's
rights against the state's interest in maintaining internal order
and security a t the institution." Courts sometimes use this balancing test along with other review doctrines. For example, in
Taylor v. S t e ~ e t t the
, ~ ~Fifth Circuit applied a balancing process," a least restrictive alternative t e ~ t , ~ h na dstrict scrutiny
analysis .56
3.

The reasonable relation standard

A recent doctrine requiring that conditions of pretrial confinement be only "reasonably related" to government interests
emerged partly because not all constitutional rights are
"f~ndamental."~
This movement away from the blanket strict
scrutiny approach began with two Supreme Court cases involving
the rights of convicted prisonersMand later was adopted by the
50. See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336
(2d Cir. 1974).
51. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128,137 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Cf. Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]hrough the course of
this Court's decisions i t has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has strClck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society.").
52. See, e.g., Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d
1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
53. 532 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1976) (the issues of the case revolved around censorship of
inmate mail).
54. Id. a t 468, 472.
55. Id. a t 470 n.11.
56. Id. Strict scrutiny and compelling necessity often are used synonymously by the
courts in detainee cases. See Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 365, 379 (1st Cir. 1978) (Coffin,
C.J., dissenting).
57. Fundamental interests have included the right to have an abortion, to distribute
contraceptives, and to adopt children. See note 93 infra. Examples of basic personal
interests falling outside the ambit of strict scrutiny are employment, education, and
housing. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,312-13 (1976); San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56,74 (1972). See generally Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L.REV.462 (1977).
58. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pel1 v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974). In Jones a prison inmate labor union brought a civil rights action

.
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First Circuit. In Feely u. SampsonMthe First Circuit refused to
correct alleged overcrowded conditions a t a county jail because
the conditions were reasonably related to the institution's interest
in maintaining security. The court declared that only those
"[r]estrictions or conditions of confinement that are without
reasonable relation to the state's purpose in confining the de~ standard of review is in
tainee . . . violate due p r o ~ e s s . "This
accordance with a line of Supreme Court cases holding that
"[alt the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
It also follows the reafor which the individual is c~mrnitted."~'
soning of section 3(a) of the Bail Reform Act6*that allows a judge
to impose conditions on pretrial release that he deems to be
"reasonably necessary. "

In Bell v. Wolfish the Supreme Court held that in evaluating
conditions or restrictions of pretrial confinement that implicate
deprivation of liberty without due process of law, the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the
detainee." The Court denounced the use of the "presumption of
innocence" doctrine as a source of a pretrial detainee's right to
be free from punishment," and held that the proper source of this
challenging regulations prohibiting the solicitation of inmates to join the union, barring
all meetings, and refusing delivery of union publications mailed in bulk to inmates. The
restrictions were upheld because they were "rationally related to the reasonable . . .
objectives of prison administration." 433 U.S. a t 129. In Pel1 inmates and journalists
challenged the constitutionality of a prison regulation forbidding inmate interviews with
media representatives except as authorized by prison officials. The Court upheld the
regulation and declined to apply strict scrutiny. 417 U.S. a t 827.
59. 570 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1978).
60. Id. a t 369 (footnote omitted). Chief Justice Coffin filed a strong dissent advocating the adoption of the compelling necessity standard. He said, "I have found only three
pretrial detainee cases which appear to provide support for the majority's standard." Id.
at 378 (Coffin, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
61. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U S . 715,738 (1972). Jackson involved a state statute that
allowed judges to commit defendants found incompetent to institutions where they remained until adjudged sane. This practice was held unconstitutional as violative of both
due process and equal protection. See also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S.
245, 260 (1972).
62. 18 U.S.C. 4 3146 (a) (5) (1976).
63. 99 S. Ct. a t 1872.
64. Id. a t 1870. The Court conceded that the presumption of innocence plays an
important role in the criminal justice system. It allocates the burden of proof in trials and
serves as an admonishment to the jury to judge the accused solely on the evidence produced at trial. The Court held, however, that the presumption of innocence doctrine is
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right is the due process clause.65
The Court also repudiated the compelling necessity standard
as a means of evaluating conditions of pretrial confinement allegedly violating the due process clause,88and held that if conditions
or practices are "reasonably related" to a legitimate state interest, there is no punishment; a different result would occur if it can
be shown that detention officials expressly intended to punish
detainees.67
A court may infer the punitive intent of officials if a restriction is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose.6RThe Court added, however, that any inference of a punitive intent will be dispelled if restraints are reasonably related to
the institution's interest in effectively managing the fa~ility.~"
Applying this reasonable relationship test to the conditions
and practices allegedly violating due process in the instant case,
the Court found they did not constitute punishment in violation
of pretrial detainees' rights. There was a rational basis for each
of the challenged rules and no punitive intent was shown to
exist .70
In his dissenting opinion Justice Marshall argued that the
proper test should be whether the interests of the government
outweigh the deprivations suffered by any given re~triction.~'
He
also advocated the adoption of the compelling necessity standard
when conditions infringe fundamental interest^.^^ The main concern in Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion was that the majority's test for punishment will be so difficult to meet that it will
leave detainees with virtually no p r o t e ~ t i o n . ~ ~
not applicable to a determination of the rights of detainees. Id. a t 1871.
65. Id. a t 1872.
66. Id. a t 1870-71.
67. Id. a t 1873-74.
68. Id. a t 1874.
69. Id. a t 1875.
70. Id. a t 1885-86. When confronted with the room search and body-cavity search
issues, the Court applied the traditional test of whether the search was unreasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. a t 1883-84. This Note, however, focuses
only on the Court's due process standard of review.
71. Id. a t 1890-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id. a t 1890.
73. Id. a t 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the presumption
of innocence is applicable to pretrial detention. Referring to the majority's holding that
it is not applicable, Justice Stevens said, "I cannot believe the Court means what i t seems
to be saying." Id. a t 1896-97 n.11.
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In. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfishresolved the question
of how to evaluate the conditions of pretrial confinement. It reversed the prior majority rule requiring that a compelling necessity exist to justify practices and conditions of detention,74and
adopted the reasonable relationship standard. The subjective intent of detention authorities was held to be an important consideration when applying this standard.
This Note will analyze the test laid down by the Court to
review conditions of pretrial confinement and the implications
that this will have in future detainee cases. It will also discuss
tests consistent with Bell v. Wolfish that are still available to
courts.
A.

The Wolfish Test for Conditions of Confinement

1. Rejection of the compelling necessity rationale

The Court's rejection of the compelling necessity test was
justified for two reasons. First, the Court's policy has been that
prison officials should be given "wide-ranging" deference in the
making and implementing of practices in their institutions, and
that compelling necessity should apply only when fundamental
rights are involved.75The reasonable relationship doctrine provides the means for courts to now accomplish this policy. Second,
the application of the compelling necessity doctrine to all conditions of confinement was an invitation for detainees to challenge
any condition or practice, however minor.76The recent and unprecedented increase in detainee litigation illustrates the problem. The reasonable relationship standard should remove some
of the incentive for bringing frivolous complaints.
7 4 . See note 45 supra.

75. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,405 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155 (1973). It is unclear whether the circuit court's compelling necessity standard
applied to all conditions of confinement or just those infringing a fundamental right.
Compare Brief for Respondents at 38-39, Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979) (the circuit
court only required substantial deprivations to be justified by a compelling interest) with
Brief for Petitioner at 46 (the circuit court required a compelling necessity for all restrictions of confinement). See also Note, Standard of Judicial Review for Conditions of
Pretrial Detention, 63 MINN.L. REV.457, 480-81 (1979) (Wolfish v. Levi requires courts
to determine which conditions inhere in confinement before applying the compelling
necessity standard).
76. See note 4 supra.
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The punitive intent requirement

The Court's promulgation of punitive intent as an additional
consideration for courts under the reasonable relation test is of
questionable merit77and gave two of the dissenters d i f f i c ~ l t y . ~ ~
But since under the Court's test intent may be inferred by the
courts when challenged practices are not reasonably related to
legitimate government objecti~es,~"he reasonable relationship
test arguably stands alone, independent of the punitive intent
requirement. In any event, a revised version of the least restrictive alternative doctrine should enable detainees to more easily
prove intent.
The Supreme Court recognized the least restrictive alternative doctrine in Shelton v. Tucker,80where the Court held that
governmental purposes "cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved."" The Court in the instant case, however, skirted the doctrine by rejecting the use of the compelling
necessity rationaleR2and by finding the rights involved not fundamental. The Court did recognize, however, that when extremely
harsh detention practices are employed in lieu of less restrictive
alternatives, courts may find that the intent of the officials was
p~nitive.~Vl'his
punitive intent would render the practice unconstitutional.
77. See, e.g., Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 380 (1st Cir. 1978). See also H.
PACKER,
THELIMITSOF THE CRIMINAL
S A N ~ I O32-33
N (1968) (allowing the characterization
of punishment to turn on the intent of the administrator would encourage hypocrisy and
self-deception).
78. 99 S. Ct. a t 1887-88(Marshall, J., dissenting); id. a t 1897-99(Stevens, J., dissenting).
The element of punitive intent has not been used to review conditions of pretrial
confinement; i t has been used t o review legislative acts. See Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (Nationality and Immigration Act); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603 (1960) (Social Security Act); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (New
York Waterfront Commission Act).
79. 99 S. Ct. a t 1874.
80. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
81. Id. a t 488 (footnote omitted). See also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59
THELAWOF CORRECTIONS
AND PRISONER'S
RIGHTS226 (1973).
(1973); S. KRANTZ,
82. The least restrictive alternative doctrine and the compelling necessity standard
are often used together. See, e.g., Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 379 (1st Cir. 1978)
(Coffin, C.J., dissenting).
83. 99 S. Ct. a t 1874 n.20.
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B. Alternative Considerations for Detainees and Courts
after Wolfish
Although Bell u. Wolfish represents the first attempt by the
Supreme Court to clarify the law regarding pretrial confinement,
it was not exhaustive. The holding was narrow; many issues were
left unresolved, and still others were not addressed a t all.
1.

Narrowness of the holding

One of the important facts that strongly influenced the Court
was the relatively short period of time that pretrial detainees
spent a t the MCC.84The Court had recently considered length of
confinement important when deciding whether prison conditions
meet constitutional standards.85 A district court also recently
held that the "frequent and substantial periods of time that inmates are allowed to be out of their cells" is an additional factor
to be considered when evaluating prison condition^.^^ This is a
significant point because it narrows the implications of the holding and may leave the gate open for lower courts to invalidate
practices and conditions similar to those found a t the MCC when
detainees are incarcerated over extended periods of time,s7 even
if the practices are reasonably related to governmental interests.
84. Over half of the unsentenced detainees remained less than 10 days a t the MCC,
three-quarters were released within a month, and more that 85% were released within 60
days. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118,129 n.25 (2d Cir. 1978). The Court in the instant case
emphasized this fact by referring to it six times in the opinion. See 99 S. Ct. a t 1866 n.3,
1875-76, 1881-82, 1886.
85. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) ("A filthy, overcrowded cell and
a diet of 'grue' might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or
months.").
86. Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 109 (C.D. Cal. 1978). This distinction
is important because detainees a t the MCC were only confined in their cells a t night.
During the rest of the time, they could move freely about the common areas. See 99 S.
Ct. a t 1875.
87. One study showed the average length of time from arrest to the end of trial (not
sentencing) of all felonies in eight jurisdictions to be as follows:
Rhode Island
377 days
Milwaukee
229 days
Detroit
224 days
222 days
District of Columbia
Indianapolis
186 days
Cobb County, Ga.
171 days
Los Angeles
125 days
New Orleans
116 days
Pretrial Release or Detention: Hearings on H. R. 547 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1977)
(prepared testimony of William A. Hamilton, Institute of Law and Social Research).
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In view of this consideration, courts may find it helpful to establish short-term maximum limits during which pretrial detainees
may be confined prior to tria1F
2.

Heightened scrutiny for lengthy confinement

The problem that the Court left unsolved is how to determine
when length of confinement becomes so long that it necessitates
a finding of unconstitutionality. A reasonable approach t o this
problem is simply to increase the degree of judicial scrutiny as the
length of confinement increases. This method seems to best satisfy the Court's emphasis on length of confinement. It also accords with a recent Supreme Court case requiring a heightened
degree of scrutiny for rights that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history" but that are not classified as f ~ n d a m e n t a l ?The
~
essence of this "sliding scale" approach to judicial review is that
conditions of confinement may, as the weeks and months pass,
violate constitutional guarantees, requiring a substantial degree
of necessity to justify them.
3.

Other means available to challenge conditions of confinement

The majority opinion carefully pointed out that the test of
whether conditions of confinement amount to punishment is
applicable only in cases alleging deprivation of liberty without
due process of law.QoThe Court followed this rule by applying
different standards of review to the issues involving the first and
fourth amendments." This narrows the holding and leaves open
many avenues by which future detainees may challenge the conditions of their confinement. The Court did not expressly reject
the use of the compelling necessity standard when a more specific
88. See, e . g , NATIONAL
ADVISORY
COMMISSION
ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICESTANDARDS
AND
GOALS,TASKFORCEREPORT,COURTS
68 (1973) (the period from arrest to the beginning of
trial should not be longer than 60 days in felony prosecutions and 30 days in misdeameanor
prosecutions). Cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-87 (1978) (prisoner's length of stay
in isolated confinement limited to 30 days).
89. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99, 503 (1977). See also
Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Brief for Petitioner a t 34, Bell
v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979); Brief for Respondents a t 40 n.39.
90. 99 S. Ct. a t 1872.
91. For example, the detainees alleged that the room search and the body-cavity
search practices violated the fourth amendment, so the Court discussed whether the
searches were "unreasonable" within the meaning of that amendment. Id. a t 1883. This
required the Court to balance the need for the search against the invasion of personal
rights. Id. a t 1884.
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constitutional guarantee than "due process" is involved.92In fact,
the Court implied that such a test would apply when fundamental liberty interests are affected.g3The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, however, appears to refute this implication."
4. A proposed classification method

In determining the constitutionality of pretrial detention
practices, courts should give consideration to the individual characteristics of detainees. The degree of judicial scrutiny employed
by a court should be less where dangerous detainees are involved
and more in the case of relatively innocuous persons. The Supreme Court has recognized in an analogous situation that justice
generally requires courts to consider individual characteristics
when determining prison sentencesF
This method of protecting individual rights could begin when
the detainee is first incarcerated by separating detainees who
pose a threat to security from those who should be accorded lenien~y.~"uch a system could also include a separation of sentenced
offenders from persons awaiting trial.g7Referring to a similar
92. The due process clause "provides no basis for application of a compelling necessity standard to conditions of pretrial confinement that are not alleged to infringe any
other, more specific guarantee of the Constitution." Id. at 1871.
93. Id. The Court stated that the detainees' desire to be free from discomfort "does
not rise to the level of those fundamental liberty interests" delineated in cases such as
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion laws affect a fundamental right); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives is unconstitutional); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (a hearing is required before giving
motherless children to the state instead of to the unwed fathers). Id. a t 1871. But see 99
S. Ct. a t 1900 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the practices challenged here do affect fundamental rights).
94. By advocating the use of the compelling necessity standard for fundamental
interests, Justice Marshall seemed to imply that the majority had held otherwise. 99 S.
Ct. a t 1890 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (individualizing sentencing
determinations requires the court to consider the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense). Cf. Bail Reform Act $ 3(a), 18
U.S.C. $ 3146(b) (1976) (judges imposing conditions of pretrial release should consider the
offense, the weight of the evidence, family ties, etc.).
96. E.g., S. KRANTZ,supra note 81, at 226. See also Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d
521,546-47 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (appellate court &imed order that detention facility officials
classify pretrial detainees to determine inmates requiring maximum security, and those
who should be allowed contact visits); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1974)
(classification system applied by interviewing the detainees).
COMMISSION
ON LAWENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE,
97. PRESIDENT'S
TASKFORCEREPORT:CORRECTIONS
24 (1967). This report recognized that separation of
detainees from convicted prisoners, along with appropriate improvement of conditions, is
an important step to improve the treatment of detainees.
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practice, the Colorado Supreme Court has noted that states have
the right to "deny contact visitation to individual detainees who
present a threat to the security of the institution and . . . to all
.
detainees in certain emergency situations . . . ."98

C. A Return to the Hands-Off Doctrine
The Court in the instant case not only identified the sources
of a detainee's constitutional rights and the tests used to protect
them, but also clarified its position concerning judicial intervention into prison affairs. The message of the Court's opinion is that
the judiciary is to retreat towards the traditional "hands-off"
This retreat is now occurring in the lower courts.100The
exceptions to this rule occur when specific constitutional rights
are infringed,I0'or when there is a clear showing that prison officials have "exaggerated their response" to maintain security.Io2

IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's rejection of compelling necessity as a
due process standard of review in pretrial detainee cases reversed
a trend followed by a majority of lower courts. The reasonable
relationship standard adopted by the Court limits judicial involvement in prison affairs and provides detention facility authorities with greater freedom to implement security policies.
While pretrial detainees may find it more difficult to meet
the Court's standard for proving violations of due process, the less
restrictive alternative doctrine is still available to prove the punitive intent behind challenged prison conditions. In addition, more
lengthy periods of confinement than those involved in the instant
case may justify application of a more enhanced scrutiny analysis. Finally, individual traits and characteristics of detainees
should be important factors for determining the constitutionality
of prison practices.
George Mark A1 bright
98. Wesson v. Johnson, 579 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Colo. 1978) (civil rights action on behalf
of pretrial detainees in county jail who were denied all contact visits).
99. 99 S. Ct. at 1886. After commending federal courts for condemning sordid prison
conditions, the majority stated, "But many of these same courts have, in the name of the
Constitution, become increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations." Id.
100. See, e.g., Cender v. Johnson, Civ. No. 78-3307 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1979) (court
dismissed complaint under Bell u. Wolfish).
101. 99 S. Ct. 1871.
102. See id. at 1875 n.23, 1878-79, 1880, 1882, 1886.

